Accident victims are entitled to compensation form ZUS (Social Insurance), beyond that, if the accident took place due to the fault of the employer, he is then obligated to repair the damage.

We run the <strong>arbitration proceedings, mediation (before the court)</strong>, as well as provide representation in pre-litigation procedure.

<strong>Fee</strong> in the form of a commission charge is always taken after obtaining the compensation to the victim. <strong>We operate effectively.</strong>

For the victims, we offer comprehensive legal assistance related to the investigation of compensation from employers and their insurers in terms of:
<ul>
	<li>funeral reimbursement,</li>
	<li>life annuity,</li>
	<li>compensation for the significant deterioration life situation (material and immaterial),</li>
	<li>compensation for damages and pain caused by accident,</li>
	<li>treatment refund,</li>
	<li>lost profit refund,</li>
	<li>better nutrition refund.</li>
</ul>
Employee who had an accident and suffered damage in the form of bodily injury or heath disorder, can demand from the employer compensation benefits according to civil code regulations. Regulations determining responsibility for tort (art. 415 and further of civil code) will be essential in this situation. The most essential is art.444 § 1 and 2 of the Civil Code, which states that in case of  injury or heath damages, the compensation of damage will include all the resulting costs.

On demand of the victim, the person obligated to repair the damage, should provide the amount of money necessary for the medical treatment in advance, and if the victim become disabled – the amount of money necessary to prepare to another profession. If the victim has totally or partially lost earning capacity, or if the needs has increased or chances of success for the future has decreased, he may demand the adequate life annuity.

On possibility of such complementary claims relative to benefits based on the act from 30 October 2002 concerning social insurance for accidents at work and occupational diseases (Journal of Laws No. 199, item. 1673 as amended), The Supreme Court has repeatedly pointed out, raising that it is acceptable to seek supplementary claims form the employer for the accidents at work based on the regulations of civil law (Art. 415, 444 and 445 of the Civil Code).

This is due to the fact that the act mentioned above does not contain any restrictions on the possibility of asserting claims for damages from the employer, when the injury suffered by the employee as a result of an accident at work is not entirely covered by Social Security.

<strong>Supplementary claims</strong>

Judicial decisions raises that the possibility to claim damages from the employer is supplementary. Therefore the employee can effectively act against an employer only after the accident insurance benefits paid by the Social Insurance Institution.

So the Supreme Court pointed out in its judgment of 29 July 1998., Ref. Act II UKN 155/98, stating unequivocally that the civil liability of the employer's responsibility for the consequences of an accident at work is complementary. Employee cannot claim compensation and life annuity on the basis of Art. 444 of the Civil Code before the recognition of his claim for benefits, based on the Act of 12 June 1975. on benefits for accidents at work and occupational diseases (Journal of Laws of 1983. No. 30, item. 144, as amended).

This thesis also retained its topicality and on the basis of the current Law of 30 October 2002 on social insurance for accidents at work and occupational diseases. So, according to the act mentioned above, only after the recognition of an employee’s one-time compensation for permanent or long-term health disorder or life annuity right, may the employee claim compensation or the life annuity from the employer.

This is justified by the fact that the benefits mentioned in the Act are limited as to the amount, while the civil liability of the employer is supplementary. This justifies the determination that the provision of the Act does not entirely compensate the resultant incurred by the injured worker's loss, and also that there is a civil law basis for the employer's liability.

So the employee cannot claim compensation and life annuity according to the regulations of the Civil Code, until his claims for the benefits will be recognized. However, in case when such a claim, it would have to be considered as premature, which would result in dismissal of the complaint.

Example:

Jan Z. has been working as a truck driver for company X. While his normal duties while observing the truck loading by the crane, the protection rope securing two bricks, has suddenly broke up and two of the bricks fell on him. As it turned out the load has not been properly secured by other employees of the X company.

As a result of the accident Jan Z. has suffered a serious head and arm injury, and has to go through the long treatment process and is no longer able to do his work. Therefore he sued the company X, claiming the award on his behalf damages in the amount of 8000 pln. The company X raised that the claim is premature, because Jan Z. has not yet applied for the one-time compensation or the annuity form the Social Insurance.

Dismissal of the claim as a premature is not closing the possibility to judicial route for the later complementary claims – after gaining one-time compensation or annuity from the accident insurance. In this case the res judicata will not occur.

<strong>Terms of compensation claims</strong>

Employee, taking action against the employer with the damages claim from the damage sustained as a result of failure to provide safe working conditions can not rely in judicial proceedings solely on the fact of an accident at work, which was stated in accident protocol. He must prove incumbent on the employer's liability in tort, damage suffered (which is usually damage to health) and a causal link between the event being an accident at work and the damage claimed.

It is related to the fact that, it rests on the employee in this regard burden of proof (Art. 6 of the Civil Code). The Civil Code defines as a fundamental principle of liability based on fault. It is based on Art. 415 of the Civil Code, according to which - who with his fault causes damage to another is obliged to repair it.

Dereliction of duty related to provide the employees safety and hygienic work conditions will be the employers fault. It’s in this case very significant, that the employer is responsible not only for a breach of health and safety regulations, but also for breach of the general principles of health and safety, stemming from life experience or the rules of safe operation of a particular type of work.

Employer is also responsible for violation of the principles of social coexistence (ex. fair dealing and good morals or decency and loyalty, employee loyalty). Violation of those rules constitutes the tort. So also pointed to the Supreme Court in its judgment of 11 June 2003., Ref. Act I PK 273/02. The employer must provide employees with safe working tools, premises and buildings in which the work is performed.

It means, that the responsibility of the employer also includes the situation, when safe conditions for use of rooms or buildings where the work is being performed, has not been provided. This is clearly shown in Art. 214 § 2 of the Labour Code, according to which the employer is obliged to keep the building structures along with the work spaces within, and areas with related equipment in a safe working condition. Further clarification of this requirement include the Regulation of the Minister of Labour and Social Policy of 26 September 1997. on general safety and hygiene (consolidated text: Journal of Laws of 2003. No. 169, item. 1650 as amended).

Defectiveness of such premises or facilities caused by their constructors or the contractor does not relieve the employer from responsibility for the proper condition of occupational health and safety. It is also important that a general obligation on employers to ensure safe working conditions is absolute, and its implementation is not dependent on financial or organizational capability or employer.

<strong>Strict liability</strong>

Employers liability can also be formed on a risk basis. This is due to the art. 435 of the Civil Code, where it is stated that someone who is self-employed and leads the business that set in motion by the forces of nature (steam, gas, electricity etc.) is fully responsible for the damage on person or property done to anybody because of the operation of the business, unless the damage has been done by the force majeure or solely the fault of the victim or a third person, for which the employer is not responsible. This represents a tightening of the rules governing liability.

This regulation will be applicable mostly for the employers like: utilities, transportation, construction, mines, mills etc. Those employers use in their own business the force of nature that cause danger form the definition.

Warto przy tym podkreślić, że w procesie o odszkodowanie od pracodawcy, którego odpowiedzialność jako prowadzącego przedsiębiorstwo wprawiane w ruch siłami przyrody oparta jest na zasadzie ryzyka (art. 435 § 1 k.c.), zbędne jest ustalanie, czy można mu przypisać zawinienie lub bezprawne zaniedbanie w zakresie obowiązków dotyczących stworzenia bezpiecznych i higienicznych warunków pracy. Tak też wskazywał Sąd Najwyższy w wyroku z 14 lutego 2002 r., sygn. akt I PKN 853/00. Nie ma zatem znaczenia, czy można przypisać pracodawcy winę, gdyż jego wina lub jej brak nie jest w tym przypadku przesłanką odpowiedzialności.

Okolicznościami, które mogą wyłączyć odpowiedzialność pracodawcy, są: siła wyższa, wyłączna wina poszkodowanego pracownika lub osoby trzeciej, za którą pracodawca nie odpowiada. Poprzez siłę wyższą należy tu rozumieć zdarzenie wyjątkowe, nadzwyczajne, którego zajście jest niemożliwe do przewidzenia i zapobieżenia. Przykładowo może to być pożar, uderzenie pioruna, powódź, wojna lub zamieszki wewnętrzne.

Przy czym siła wyższa, mogąca obalić domniemanie przyczynowości ruchu przedsiębiorstwa dla szkody, musi występować jako przyczyna wyłączna, zewnętrzna, nadzwyczajna, co więcej - gwałtowna, nieprzewidywalna i nieuchronna. Wyłącza wina poszkodowanego jako okoliczność wyłączająca odpowiedzialność pracodawcy musi być interpretowana ściśle. A zatem nie zachodzi ona w sytuacji, gdy oprócz winy pracownika zaistniały jeszcze jakiekolwiek inne przyczyny wystąpienia wypadku. Gdyż wyłączna wina w spowodowaniu szkody, przewidziana w art. 435 § 1 k.c., występuje tylko wtedy, gdy zawinione działanie poszkodowanego było jedyną przyczyną wypadku.

Przy czym o wykluczeniu odpowiedzialności pracodawcy - na podstawie art. 435 § 1 k.c. - za szkody z wypadku przy pracy nie pokryte świadczeniami z ustawy wypadkowej nie decyduje rodzaj czy stopień winy poszkodowanego, tylko jej wyłączność w spowodowaniu szkody. Tak też wskazywał Sąd Najwyższy w wyroku z 4 czerwca 1997 r., sygn. akt II UKN 158/97.

Przykład:
Adam F. był zatrudniony jako szlifierz w fabryce X. 2 października 2006 r., po rozpoczęciu pracy na szlifierce, w celu ułatwienia sobie manewrów zdjął osłonę i bez wymaganej pomocy drugiego pracownika sam rozpoczął szlifowanie metalu. W pewnym momencie jego dłoń została wciągnięta przez maszynę. W wyniku tego wypadku został on pozbawiony kciuka lewej dłoni. Adam F. - po uzyskaniu jednorazowego odszkodowania z ZUS - wystąpił z pozwem przeciwko pracodawcy, wnosząc o zasądzenie zadośćuczynienia. Sąd oddalił jego powództwo, uznając, że do wypadku doszło wyłącznie z winy Adama F.

Okolicznością wyłączającą odpowiedzialność pracodawcy jest także powstanie wypadku wskutek działania osoby trzeciej, za którą pracodawca nie ponosi żadnej odpowiedzialności. Chodzi tu o osoby, z którymi pracodawcę nie łączy żaden stosunek prawny związany z ruchem przedsiębiorstwa.

Przykładowo, mogą to być przypadkowi przechodnie czy potencjalni klienci pracodawcy. Jednakże wyłączenie odpowiedzialności przedsiębiorstwa z uwagi na przewidzianą w art. 435 k.c. wyłączną winę osoby trzeciej wymaga identyfikacji tej osoby. Zwracał na to uwagę Sąd Najwyższy w wyroku z 8 listopada 1988 r., sygn. akt II CR 315/88.